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THE METAPHOR OF THE COVENANT
IN HABERMASI
Sander Griffioen

This essay discusses the idea of covenant in Habennas' social philosophy. It
does so by attempting to shed light on the kind of universality which
Habennas claims for communicative reason and by examining the limitations
of this universality. The metaphor of "atoning remembrance," as used by
Habennas in the "Historians' debate," is also considered. The essay concludes
with some observations regarding the relevance of the covenant idea for
"public philosophy."

In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Jiirgen Habermas offers a fascinating comparison between the binding force of communicative reason and
the covenant made by Yahweh and the people of Israel. "Covenant" is not
among Habermas' central metaphors; indeed he introduces it here only by
way of a reference to another author. Nevertheless, as I will show, it is
worthwhile exploring the significance that the covenant idea might have for
Habermas' thought. What is implied when Habermas, the foremost defender
of the Enlightenment project in the area of social philosophy, emphatically
endorses the claim that the concept of "enlightenment" is only conceivable
as a "covenant" or "confederation"? And what, if anything, can such a thought
contribute to Christian social thought?

Exclusion and Inclusion
The passage in question occurs in Lecture XI of The Philosophical Discourse. 2 In one of the early sections of this lecture, entitled "Communicative
versus Subject-Centered Reason," Habermas considers the kind of
postmodern critique of the Enlightenment set forth by Foucault and others.
This critique portrays the ideal of reason as inherently oppressive. Reason,
the argument goes, can only exclude, and thus marginalise, everything that
does not fit its mold. The critics accusingly point to the rationalist's depreciation of nature, the human body, fantasy, desire, and the feelings.3
Habermas sets up his defense against this critique by distinguishing between subject-centered reason and communicative reason. The postmoderns,
he agrees, rightly criticize the "exclusion model of reason" (p. 306). However,
he hastens to add, the exclusion model only applies to "subject-centered
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reason," i.e., reason reduced to the instruments of cognition and purposive
action (pp. 305-14); or, put simply, the view of reason propagated by
Descartes and his followers. In this sense, indeed, reason is "a product of
division and usurpation" (p. 316). With respect to communicative reason,
however, Habermas insists that it is based in the integrating powers of human
communication, and that therefore the postmodern critique of this kind of
reason is far off target. Its area of application thus enlarged, reason would
not be divisive but community-building.
The integrating function of reason involves among other things the extension of the criteria of rationality from the cognitive-instrumental dimension
to the moral-practical domain; rationality, then, is not just a matter of propositional truth, but also of normative rightness (pp. 314-15).4 One example
of the application of this norm is the distinction between successful and
unsuccessful communication which we will meet at various places in this
essay.
At this juncture, Habermas faces a new objection. How can communication
be rational and still be conditioned by material life processes (p. 321)? Is not
the whole idea of communication thoroughly idealistic? Obviously the
postmodern critics are now being joined by his old Marxist friends. Has he
not exchanged materialism for an idealism of universalistic validity claims
(p. 321)? Habermas now needs to show that the "ideal" is not cut off from
the "real." Successful interaction, he argues, requires ideal conditions; in
particular it requires that there be no significant inequality between participants with respect to power. While engaged in communication one has to
presuppose that these conditions have indeed been met: this much is implied
by being under the sway of the norm of rationality. However, when viewed
by outsiders-or, as he puts it, when viewed from a "third-person perspective" (p. 324)-one becomes aware of the actual limitations. In this respect
no process of communication is ever without obstacles, such as asymmetric
power relations, conflicts, etc. (pp. 322-24).
The distinction between successful and unsuccessful interaction is operative in yet another way. The objection that the tradition of rational thought,
starting with Parmenides, has consistently discriminated between the "few
who are in the truth" and "the many who stay behind in the darkness of their
blindness" (p. 324) is part and parcel of the criticisms mentioned above.
Replying to the accusation that the theory of communicative action remains
caught in this elitism, Habermas retorts that it emphatically does not separate
knowledge and ignorance in the Parmenidian sense of a hierarchy of two
different communities. Those who do not live by the light of reason are not
set apart in an inferior form of life. Rather, their "irrationality" is understood
as "unsuccessful communication" which as such remains linked to "successful communication." Or put differently, Habermas tries to make clear that the
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nonn of rationality is not divisive. Its application does not result in two
opposing forms of life: successful and unsuccessful interaction pertain to one
"common fonn of life" (p. 324).
It is within this context that the tenns "covenant" (Bund) and "confederation"
(Bundesgenossenschaft) emerge (p. 325). It is especially intriguing that the
text is not silent about the biblical moorings of the term "covenant." According to Klaus Heinrich, whom Habennas quotes here, the model of the kind of
confederation which is meant here is the covenant of Yahweh with the people
of Israel. Just as God's wrath against sin protects the covenant, so communicative
reason has its own dialectic of "betrayal and vengeance." The confederation
is "a potentially universal confederation against betrayal" (p. 325).
It is not easy to understand what exactly is meant by "betrayal" and "vengeance." Yet even at this early stage of our argument it is becoming clear that
the emphasis is on inclusion. Those who do not live by the light of reason
are not excluded and marginalised, but remain within its bounds. Let it be
noted that the very idea of universality is inclusively conceived. The universal
as it is meant here does not originate from the abstraction of all particulars.
Rather, it results from the integration of the particulars. And there is even
more to it than that. In keeping with dialectical thought in general, the inclusion is also meant to extend to those cases where the particular obtains the
character of the negative, i.e., of something contradicting the ideal. To get
clearer on this we will look at Hegel's account of the dialectic.

Hegel and Dialectical Inclusion
The idea of dialectical inclusion has found its most powerful expression in
the thought of Hegel. He is the one who in The Phenomenology of Mind
emphatically stated that the power of "spirit" does not take the form of "a
positive which turns away from the negative"; but that "spirit is this power
only by looking the negative in the face, and dwelling with it"; "this dwelling
beside," he continued, "is the magic power that converts the negative into
being."5 It is important to see that Habennas no longer believes in Hegelian
magic. "Reconciliation" has become in his thought an ideal, rather than a
reality. In this respect the distance between their philosophies is considerable.
But in one important respect Habermas is still inspired by Hegel's vision: the
"dwelling beside" spells out the essence of solidarity. Put briefly, Hegel's
model of reconciliation forms the basis for understanding Habermas' affirmation of solidarity.
Habermas' main interest concerns one particular theme of the younger
Hegel's. In The Philosophical Discourse, just after the extensive quotation
from Heinrich's book, he notes that the dialectic of betrayal and vengeance
has a close analogy in an early fragment from Hegel on crime and punishment
(p. 325). In other places one finds similar references to this dialectic. 6 The
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manuscript referred to is entitled The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate; it
dates from 1798-99, i.e., some 10 years before The Phenomenology appeared
(1807).
The fundamental assumption of The Spirit is that ethical life (Sittlichkeit)
forms a totality. Within its bounds communality is unavoidable. Committing
a crime under these conditions means to alienate oneself from the ethical
totality. Or put more strongly: it means to violate one's own life. As a consequence, the totality itself turns into an alien, punishing force. The destruction of life turns life into an enemy. Consequently, the criminal suffers
because of his alienation.? Hegel illustrates the turning of life into an enemy
by a reference to Macbeth. Macbeth kills Banquo, who had approached him
as a friend; Banquo, instead of vanishing, returns as an haunting spirit. What
is true of Macbeth holds for every trespasser: "In his arrogance he has destroyed indeed, but only the friendliness of life; he has perverted life into an
enemy" (p. 229).
The dialectic of crime and punishment is itself part of a larger whole. The
main subject of Hegel's manuscript is the reconciliation of "fate" in love.
Fate is the alien, inimical aspect of reality. The manuscript opens with a
chapter on the "spirit of Judaism." In Hegel's account, the Old Testament
remains enclosed within the horizon of "fate." Israel is a people of slaves
placed under a stern master who rules by command. 8 Rebellion against bondage can only have the fateful result of leading to a further destruction of the
friendliness of life. It is at this juncture that Hegel for the first time introduces
Macbeth. The fate of the Jewish people, he says, is similar to that of Macbeth,
who "clung to alien Beings, and so in their service had to trample and slay
everything holy in human nature" (p. 205).
In (neo-)gnostic fashion Hegel then contrasts the New Testament as the
Gospel of love to the darkness of the Old Testament. Jesus frees us from fate;
in love fate is reconciled (p. 232). The dialectical movement ends with the
"reestablishment of the disintegrated totality. "9 "Life can heal its wounds
again"; Hegel anticipates here (p. 230) his famous formulation in The Phenomenology of Mind: "The wounds of the spirit heal without leaving scars."10
However, for Hegel a genuine reconciliation lies beyond the New Testament.
In Jesus only an abstract reconciliation is attained, one situated in an ideal
world: a kingdom not of this earth. His "tragedy" was that he could not free
himself entirely from the fate of his people (p. 285); it was this fate that killed
him.ll
As indicated earlier, in The Philosophical Discourse Habermas repeatedly
returns to the dialectic of ethical life. In responding to an interviewer's question, Habermas offers an interesting parallel. 12 Asked what animates his philosophizing, he refers to a "foundational intuition," viz., that community and
individuality are not per se at odds. This inspiring vision, he goes on to say,
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is one of a communality in which the friendliness of life is experiencedhowever, leaving room for conflicts. Once again Hegel is mentioned as one
source of such representations of successful interaction. 13
Indeed, Hegel's significance for our theme is considerable, in at least two
respects. First, in both Hegel and Habermas the emphasis on communality is
part of an attempt to overcome a certain narrowness in the Enlightenment
tradition, especially as represented by Kant. In The Spirit of Christianity
Hegel contrasts the Gospel of love both with Mosaic law and with Kant's
ethics (pp. 213-14; 211n). Even though Kant is mentioned only a few times,
it is not an exaggeration to say that throughout this entire manuscript the
"Moses of modem ethics" is present in the immediate background. In fact,
within Hegel's development this essay represents the first clear attempt to
transcend Kant's ethics. 14 In a similar vein, Habermas presents "communicative reason" as the answer to the limitations of the early Enlightenment,
especially the ideal of subject-centered reason which dominated the early
Enlightenment thought during the period, roughly speaking, from Descartes
to Kant.
Let it be understood, though, that neither Hegel nor Habermas wants to
abandon the Enlightenment project. In Hegel's case one could speak of a
radicalization. Kant had taught that for freedom to prevail, human inclinations, emotions, and passions need to be brought under the rule of reason.
Hegel objects, however, that a person whose inclinations are in bondage to
reason is still a slave, though a slave to himself. 15 Freedom requires that the
hegemony of reason be replaced by the self-rule of love. Immediately, one is
aware of the parallel to the way in which Habermas faces the postmodern
critique of reason, viz., by dissociating the rule of reason from all historical
connotations of hegemony, and by stressing instead that the binding force of
reason be understood as issuing only from the basic solidarity of people living
together. 16
Second, it has become apparent that "the avenging force" is (for the most
part) modelled on Hegel's idea of the causality of fate. Both Hegel and
Habermas assume that ethical reality is, so to speak, responsive to human
action: to those who accept the ethical bond life shows its friendliness; to
those who, for whatever reason, become estranged from this bond or rebel
against it, it turns into an avenging force.
In all of this, though, both Hegel and Habermas remain true to the tenets
of the Enlightenment. Revenge, punishment, and the like, only appear to
come as heteronomous forces. In fact, the criminal punishes himself. Hegel
explains: "the sinner is more than a sin existent" (p. 238), i.e., the crime does
not exhaust the being of the criminal, for he remains part of the ethical
totality. Therefore, just as much as his crime turns against himself, his ethical
being turns against his crime. This then opens the way to a solution: the inner
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conflict leading to remorse and to reconciliation. Similarly, as indicated earlier, Habermas places "betrayal" in the light of reconciliation. His aim is to
formulate a model of dialectical inclusion in order to face the postmodern
accusation of exclusivity.
Habermas, to be sure, is much less confident than Hegel was that reconciliation will in fact come about. Here the difference arises to which I alluded
earlier. While "communality" may be unavoidable for Habermas, it does not
lead automatically to the acceptance of "communal responsibility."17 It requires people to make a covenant against betrayal.

Covenant and Betrayal
Even after a superficial reading of The Spirit of Christianity one notices
that its author misunderstands the biblical portrayal of God's covenantal
relationship with his people. Hegel simply takes the Old Testament as the
embodiment of legalism. 18
As indicated above, the metaphor of the covenant is introduced in The
Philosophical Discourse not through Hegel but via a lengthy quotation from
Klaus Heinrich. 19 Heinrich is a student of religion with a special interest in
the relation of myth to revelation. His interpretation of both is inspired by
Paul Tillich.
The first part of the quote introduces the covenant as a symbol. It leads up
to an idea which we have already noted, betrayal as self-betrayal:
Keeping the covenant with God is the symbol of fidelity; breaking this covenant is the model of betrayal. To keep faith with God is to keep faith with
life-giving Being itself-in oneself and others. To deny it in any domain of
being means breaking the covenant with God and betraying one's own foundation ... Thus, betrayal of another is simultaneously betrayal of oneself. (p.
325).

Heinrich then argues that the biblical covenant is universal because in principle it excludes no one. The "prophetic tradition" from which it stems differs
radically from Greek philosophy. From Parmenides on, Greek tradition
sought the Good Life in an ideal realm, situated above or behind the ambiguities of everyday life. Heinrich presumes that this ideal issues from an ethos
of resignation .
... and every protest against betrayal is not just protest in one's own name,
but in the name of the other at the same time .... The idea that each being is
potentially a "covenant partner" in the fight against betrayal, including anyone who betrays himself and me, is the only counterbalance against the stoic
resignation already formulated by Parmenides when he made a cut between
those who know and the mass of the ignorant (p. 325).

Heinrich's contention is that the European Enlightenment stands in this prophetic tradition. Basically, he argues, it is not after an esoteric knowledge
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that is accessible to only an elite; it seeks to enlighten all. The final sentence
of the quotation brings the argument to a climax: "The concept of enlightenment familiar to us is unthinkable without the concept of a potentially universal confederation against betrayal. "20
Although it would be wrong to suggest that Heinrich's name occurs on every
other page of Habermas' works, it is nevertheless significant that the attention
Philosophical Discourse pays to him does have parallels in earlier works. As
early as 1964 Habermas published a review of Heinrich's Versuch iiber die
Schwierigkeit nein zu sagen. Some years later, in 1967, he included an excursus
on Heinrich's ideas in his lengthy discussion of Gadamer's Wahrheit und
MethodeY In the 2nd edition of Zur Logik der SozialwissenschaJten (1970)
the original review was republished (pp. 322-29), to be reissued once more
in Philosophisch-politische Profile (1981).22
There is much in the 1964 review with which we are already more or less
familiar, especially the contrast between the Greek ideal of a harmonious
totality on the one hand-a cosmos that is freed from the vicissitudes of
everyday life-and on the other hand the commitment of the "prophets of
Israel" to "a universal confederation" directed at the reconciliation of those
who have betrayed the covenant.
In one respect the review is certainly illuminating: it makes us understand
somewhat better the meaning of "betrayal" in this connection. "Betrayal" is
linked to two forms of alienation affecting in our days the relationship of the
individual to society (or to a segment of it). The first form is that of a complete
identification of the individual with the collective. The second is that of
isolation. Whereas the first leads to destruction of the individual self, the
second leads to destruction of the social bond.
Habermas seems to have been attracted by the link here with language and
communication. Heinrich argues that both identification and separation leave
the individual speechless (sprachlos). Speech implies a difference between
speaker and hearer, which disappears once complete identification prevails.
But in a state of isolation the individual becomes speechless as well. One
recognizes here, of course, the argument against the possibility of "private
languages." A living language is a social phenomenon. To be human is to
speak; to speak is to be related to a wider community. Hence, in both forms
of alienation, to bring about healing it is necessary that communication be
resumed. In communication dwells the power of reconciliation. 23
Bit by bit we are getting a better grasp of what is meant by that mysterious
word "betrayal." Identification and separation are the two shapes betrayal
takes in our days. But one point still remains to be clarified. Who betrays
whom? Who are the traitors? The individuals who isolate themselves, or those
who disappear into the collective? Or aren't these individuals rather the
victims of impersonal social forces?
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Both Heinrich and Habermas evade the question of individual guilt. The
reason, or so it seems to me, why they remain elusive in the matter of betrayal,
is that both regard it as a collective phenomenon rather than as something to
be imputed individually. Heinrich is reluctant to contrast covenant-keepers
and covenant-breakers as two opposing groups of people. Significantly, the
one great representative of the prophetic tradition, the prophet Jonah, is not
unambiguously on one side of the line. Rather, he is portrayed as someone
who himself betrayed the covenant. (Heinrich even speaks of a triple betrayal:
of himself, by trying to escape his calling; of God; and of life, because he
wanted to be dead. 24 ) Hence Heinrich's preference for the phrase "context of
guilt. "2S Habermas, in a parallel text of The Philosophical Discourse, states
expressis verbis that "fault," Schuld, should be taken in an intersubjective
sense only:
that is, in the sense of an involuntary product of an entanglement that, however things stand with individual accountability, communicative agents
would have to ascribe to communal responsibility.

He illustrates this with the effects of suicide:
It is not by chance that suicides set loose a type of shock among those close

to them, which allows even the most hardhearted to discover something of
the unavoidable communality of such a fate. 26

It is certainly true that Habermas does not uncritically take his cue from
Heinrich. His distinction between religious and philosophical languages is a
sharper one. The notion of confederation (Bundesgenossenschaft) he characterizes as a "religious motif." This motif, he continues, has been raised to
philosophical status in the (read: Habermas') theory of communicative action-as had been the case with pragmatism beforeY As a consequence, his
use of "covenant" and "confederation" is (even) looser than Heinrich's. To
him these are helpful models illuminating certain intuitions, yet not requiring
a religious commitment on the part of the users. Significantly, the indeterminate word "can" is used to indicate the relation of communicative theory to
the Old Testament: this theory, Habermas states, is guided by an intuition that
can be expressed in the concepts of the Old Testament. Apparently, it could
be expressed in other concepts as well, with the help of metaphors borrowed
from other religious sources. A case in point is his own use of the idea of an
atonement of the past, a metaphor which, via Walter Benjamin, harks back
(mainly) to Jewish mysticism.

The Historians' Debate: Solidarity and Distance
In the very first chapter of The Philosophical Discourse Habermas dedicates an excursus to Walter Benjamin's "Theses on the Philosophy of History,"28 at the center of which the idea is found that the past can and must be
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reconciled through remembering. At an earlier stage this theme had already
received some attention: Haberrnas' contribution to the volume Zur A ktualitiit
Walter Benjamins (Frankfurt, 1972) focussed on the enigmatic thesis that "a
weak messianic force has been given to us to which the past can lay claim."29
Note that this is only a weak messianic power: past unjustices cannot be
made undone;30 it is the "weak anamnestic power of a solidarity that later
generations can continue to practice only in the medium of a remembrance .... "31 But it is messianic nevertheless: the past "can at least be virtually reconciled through remembering." Haberrnas also speaks of an atoning
effect, as in a recent interview with Jean Mary Ferry: "We certainly cannot
make past suffering and injustice good; but we do have the weak power of
an atoning remembrance. "32
The historians' debate was sparked off by an article published on June 6,
1986 by the German historian Ernst Nolte, in the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung. Nolte's contention was that the annihilation of the Jews had been a
reaction to Stalin's Gulag Archipelago. 33 In this article, the uniqueness of the
Nazi atrocities was reduced to the "technical procedure of gassing. "34
Haberrnas soon joined the debate. In an essay published in Die Zeit (July 11,
1986), under the title "Apologetic Tendencies," he accused Nolte, together
with other historians of similar tendencies (e.g., A. Hill gruber, M. StUrmer,
J. Fest), of an apologetic revision of the German past. 35
Habermas does not want to relinquish in any sense the responsibility for
the past. How could one, he asks, "become the legal successor to the German
Reich and continue the traditions of German culture without taking on historical liability for the form of life in which Auschwitz was possible?"36
The only legitimate way to master the past is "remembrance, practiced in
solidarity" (p. 236). It means keeping alive "the memory of the sufferings of
those who were murdered by German hands." The "Benjaminian legacy" is
the conviction that it is precisely "these dead who have a claim to the weak
anamnestic power of solidarity. "37 What effects is historical solidarity supposed to have? What does reconciliation mean? Is it more than burning
candles for the dead? Habermas offers several hints. At one point he asserts
that those who do remember act "as though they could still somehow render
the pastness of an irreparable calamity less definitive"38; elsewhere he states
that without such an anamnestic solidarity his Jewish fellow citizens would
not be able to breathe in Germany.39 In the interview with Ferry he mentions
that "this sensibility for innocent victims ... produces a reflexive distance towards one's own traditions";4o the latter statement has several parallels in The
New Conservatism (pp. 205, 251, 262-63, 266). However important these
clues prove to be, though, in order to clarify the picture we first need to
determine the connection with our earlier discussions of Hegel and Heinrich.
Strictly speaking the relation between this new theme and the subject that
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we have been discussing is indirect rather than direct. This is because the
notion that we have a responsibility for what past generations have innocently
suffered has no analogy in Hegel, either in his early works, or in his later
writings. Nevertheless, there is a certain relationship between this new theme
and what we have been discussing up to now. Habermas, in the present
context, offers a new application of Hegel's idea of a totality of ethical life.
He applies it, one might say, retrospectively to the past. Remembrance "ties
up the present with the communicative context of universal historical solidarity. "41 By fusing Benjamin's theme of remembrance with Hegel's doctrine
of the unavoidable communality of fate, he attempts to articulate the collective responsibility of the present generation for the Third Reich era.
Naturally, as an implication of the idea of an ethical totality one expects
to find a parallel to Hegel's concept of a dialectical reconciliation. Indeed,
in this context too reconciliation does have a dialectical moment. A case in
point is Habermas' sharp distinction between two different attitudes towards
national identity. While he feels that the patriotism of the apologetic historians rests in an uncritical, "immediate" identification with the so-called "national tradition," he himself advocates a critical weighing of traditions. The
parallel is that "patriotism" in the latter case would imply the "reflexive
distance" mentioned in the Ferry interview (see supra). Some qualifications
indicating such a distance are "post-national,"42 "post-traditional," and "postconventional. "43
Habermas' attitude towards patriotism also provides a basis for a comparison with Heinrich's views. Just as the latter, Habermas wants to steer clear
of both "identification" and "separation." Whereas, on the one hand, he adamantly rejects any "immediate" identification with the German past, on the
other hand he also turns against those who refuse to accept any responsibility.
We are responsible for "those who were murdered by German hands. "44 One
recognizes in the rejected positions the two shapes "betrayal" took in
Heinrich's account. Heinrich, as will be recalled, linked "betrayal" to two
forms of alienation. The first form was a complete identification of the individual with the collective, leading to a destruction of the individual self; the
other took the shape of isolation ("separation") leading to a destruction of
the social bond.
Yet with the idea of a "reflexive distance" Habermas introduces an element
which has no parallel in our earlier discussions. Solidarity becomes restricted to
certain groups and specific traditions. What is missing here is the emphasis on
the universal, all-inclusive character of solidarity. As will be recalled, a major
ingredient of the metaphor of the covenant was the universal character of the
confederation against betrayal. Not even the traitors were excluded. In Hegel's
dialectic of crime and punishment it proved to be essential that the criminal,
through the causality of fate, is brought to a reconciliation with the ethical
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totality. Strictly speaking, this universal intent is lacking in Habermas' stance
in the historians' debate. There is no solidarity with either the Nazi criminals or
with the apologetic historians. In fact, Habermas even excludes his own past
from the atoning remembrance. Significantly enough, the final words of The New
Conservatism are: "the renunciation of our own disastrous traditions. "4S

Covenant and Public Philosophy
It is not uncommon for the Enlightenment to be interpreted in terms of
contract and as such to be set over against covenant-traditions. William
Sullivan's Reconstructing Public Philosophy may serve as an example. 46 Following Robert Bellah's The Broken Covenant (1975), Sullivan sharply distinguishes between the tradition of the Enlightenment and the "civil
tradition," and links the latter to both biblical and republican roots. He considers a fundamental trust which can only be brought about by means of a
"civil covenant." Enlightenment liberalism in his opinion lacks this moral
quality: it only recognizes well-defined rights and duties. Civil tradition is
guided by the "moral imperative to live according to the principles of justice
and mutual support grounded in civil covenant."47 To put this in a different
way: "Unlike the liberal idea of a contract, which emphasizes mutual obligations within clearly defined limits, a civic covenant is a bond of fundamental
trust founded upon common commitment to a moral understanding. "48
My impression is that Sullivan's approach is characteristic of much of
North American "public philosophy." At any rate it is a salient feature of
Habits of the Heart, which Sullivan co-authored with Robert Bellah and
others. In this book the problem of North American society is diagnosed as
the loss of a common public language. Individuals have become dependent
on contractual forms of interaction, which cannot but undermine community
life: "By its own logic, a purely contractual ethic leaves every commitment
unstable. Parties to a contract remain free to choose, and thus free to remake
or break every commitment, if only they are willing to pay the price for doing
SO."49

Important as this may be as a diagnosis of the present cultural predicament,
our discussions point to one correction. The Enlightenment cannot be interpreted exclusively in contractarian terms. It is not insignificant that Jiirgen
Habermas, who strongly endorses the ideals of the Enlightenment, never
employs its social contract imagery in his endorsement. The reason is not
difficult to fathom. Habermas too-just like Sullivan, Bellah and othersstarts from the norm of a basic solidarity. To articulate this he needs other
metaphors than "contract": hence his sympathy for Heinrich's "covenant'"
"confederation," and Benjamin's "remembrance."
One can appreciate the fact that Habermas places so much emphasis on
solidarity. I would insist even more strongly than he does that it be taken in
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a universal sense. Responsibility does not exclude those who go divergent
ways, who "betray" the causes we stand for. Although we argue against their
convictions-or consent to their punishment in the case of crime (to return
to Hegel's dialectic)-we do so because as fellow human beings we cannot
stay indifferent to the public side of their lives. This "holding on to each other"
I find attractive in the themes under discussion. Under conditions of religiouscultural pluralism, without such a "holding on" the fragmentation of societal life
is inescapable. In the absence of such a public ethos it is difficult to see any
future for our society. Is it not this very solidarity which is conspicuously
lacking in Northern Ireland and Lebanon? And is not the same spectre of
anarchy now coming ex oriente as well, from Russia in particular?
It is also important that the past not be excluded. Inspired by Benjamin,
Habermas develops a similar theme to what Habits of the Heart has called
"communities of memory." As indicated above, in Habermas choosing for
solidarity with some traditions implies distancing oneself from others. Although this "reflexive distance" seems to be at odds with the universalism of
his communication idea, one cannot but agree that adherence to a tradition
should never be unconditional. Traditions themselves have to be judged in
the light of such norms as justice and love.
Habermas makes no secret of the fact that his fundamental intuitions are
of a religious nature. One can appreciate the fact that he does account for the
extra-philosophical origins of the ideas he is propounding. For instance, in
the context of Benjamin's "atoning remembrance" he openly acknowledges
that "atonement" is a Christian term. 50 But does this mean that he breaks with
the Enlightenment ideal of a philosophy which is self-contained, independent
of religion? Passing from intuitions to philosophical articulations, there is no
evidence of a breakthrough. Although it is clear that to him religion is not
simply passe, and although he does occasionally express a personal attachment to the "Judeo-Christian" tradition,51 he does finally insist upon the
subordination of religion. In that section of The Philosophical Discourse
where the main theme we have been concerned with is developed, he qualifies
his agreement with Heinrich's views on "covenant" and "confederation" with
the assertion that this "religious motif' is raised to philosophical rank in the
theory of communicative action (p. 325).52 The "raising to philosophical
rank," of course, boils down to what Hegel meant with Aufhebung, viz., a
process in which religious truth is stripped of its religious form, and appropriated philosophically.
It is true that one significant difference remains vis-a-vis Hegel. The "Aufhebung" in Habermas' case is less definitive. The religious metaphors keep
returning. In this respect, Habermas' philosophy is less "post-religious," and
therefore more challenging, than I myself had long surmised. He warily
accepts co-existence with religion: "As long as in its own search for founda-
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tions it [i.e., communicative reason] can find no better words to say what
religion can say it will cautiously co-exist with the latter ...... 53 But in fact
even a certain dependency obtains: as long as the point omega of total conceptual transparence is not reached, his philosophy stays dependent on religious metaphors to articulate basic intuitions.
There is certainly something modest about this philosophy. It does not
pretend to be able to improve on the message of religion. In the final analysis,
however, this is just modesty and not genuine openness. The idea of communication remains as Habermas' horizon. It is equivalent to Hegel's "ethical
totality" both in scope and closedness. Although Habermas readily grants that
there is much within this horizon that (as yet) withstands full conceptualization, he does not relativize the idea of communication as such. Charles Taylor,
in his recent Sources of the Self, rightly criticizes him on this score. Although
agreeing with Habermas that without language there cannot be a "self," he
rejects the claims made on its behalf:
The fact that the self is constituted through exchange in language ... doesn't
in any way guarantee us against loss of meaning, fragmentation, the loss of
substance in our human environment and our affiliations. 54

One might object that at least at one point a specific qualification is introduced, viz., where Habermas brings in the element of "reflexive distance."
Did not Habermas in fact restrict the orbit of communication in the historians'
debate? Did not certain traditions and groups of persons become "ex-communicated"? Although in one sense I can appreciate this "reflexive distance,"
it is not an altogether positive factor. Critical reflex ion appears to come from
the outside. Thus communication is being restricted externally, rather than
being opened up internally towards another reality.
Let me come quickly to my final point. Enlightenment is understood by
Heinrich/Habermas as a (potentially) universal confederation against betrayal. However, the historians' debate shows that Habermas is not really true
to his universalist creed. In remembering the victims of the Third Reich the
idea of universal solidarity collapses. The Nazi crimes form a kind of betrayal
for which there is no atonement.
Universal solidarity would require an openness which is lacking in
Habermas. Loving our enemies is only possible on the basis of something
originating from beyond our horizon: God's image-in criminals, too. Acknowledgement of the imago Dei does not make crimes less serious, but it
does widen the scope of human solidarity. The late Meyer Smit, of the Vrije
Universiteit, put it this way.
What takes precedence before all else, rather, is the reality of being created
in God's image, of being placed in relation to Him: and man can never fall
from this relation however deep he indeed may fall, which is to say that man
can never lose or escape the meaning of history (see Romans).S5
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From this it follows that "holding on to one another" within the public realm
requires a religious foundation. But since every appeal to a religious foundation is bound to meet with strong disagreement, one cannot but conclude that
in the public realm universal solidarity and (recognition of) deep divisions
go hand in hand. This indeed is my conclusion. I am not sure that both sides
have been acknowledged fully in "public philosophy." As Charles Taylor
suggests, there may indeed be a parallel between Habermas and Bellah on
this score: "Habermas, rather like Bellah and his associates, elides the experiential problem under the public, as though the two could be solved for the
price of one."56 The "experiential problem" refers to the experience of fragmentation, divisions, and especially to the loss of meaning. 57 Rephrasing his
argument in my own terms: recovering a public language by itself is not
enough; one also needs to go back to, and live from the Root of solidarity.

Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
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